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Abstract 
Current study examined multivariate relationships between impulsivity, time perception, 
gambling behavior and co-variates as age, gender, education and nationality. Impulsivity, time 
perception and risk for pathological gambling (PG) was assessed in 3500 participants aged 
between 15 and 74 years (1506 men and 2024 woman, 2455 Estonians and 1075 non-Estonian 
residents of Estonia) with different educational and socio-economical background. Participants 
completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) and the modified Impulsive Behavior Scale 
(mUPPS). Time Production Task (TPT) was presented to all participants. As the result, 
impulsive subjects tend to perceive time intervals as shorter and they under produce time 
intervals more than self-controlled subjects. Impulsivity was associated with PG to the extent 
that this association can be interpreted as causal but it is not mediated by time perception as was 
hypothesized. 
Keywords: impulsivity, time perception, problem and pathological gambling, SEM 
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IMPULSIIVSUS JA AJATAJU PATOLOOGILISE HASARTMÄNGIMISE 
ENNUSTAJATENA 
 
Kokkuvõte 
Käesolev uurimistöö keskendus impulsiivsuse, ajataju ja hasartmängimise vaheliste seoste 
uurimisele ning soo, vanuse, rahvuse ja hariduse mõju hindamisele nendes seostes. Kokku osales 
uuringus 3500 Eesti elanikku vanuses 15 – 74 aastat. Valim oli esinduslik Eesti elanikkonna 
suhtes hõlmates erineva sotsiaal-majandusliku tausta ning haridustasemega inimesi. Valimi 
moodustasid 1506 meest ja 2024 naist, kellest 2455 olid eestlased ning 1075 mitte-eestlased. 
Uuringus osalejad vastasid personaalintervjuude käigus hasartmängimisega seotud käitumist 
hindavale sõeltestile (South Oaks Gambling Screen, SOGS) ja modifitseeritud impulsiivse 
käitumise küsimustikule (mUPPS). Lisaks viidi kõigi uuringus osalejatega läbi ajataju hindamise 
eksperiment. Uuringu tulemustest selgus, et impulsiivsemad inimesed kalduvad aja 
produtseerimise ülesandes produtseerima etteantud ajast lühemaid ajaintervalle, mis viitab 
subjektiivse aja kiiremale kulgemisele. Samuti leidis kinnitust, et probleemse ja patoloogilise 
hasartmängimise riski ennustab kõrgem impulsiivsuse tase. Hüpotees, et impulsiivsuse mõju 
mängurluse väljakujunemises on vahendatud ajataju poolt, ei leidnud kinnitust. 
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Introduction 
Impulsivity plays an important role in understanding and diagnosis of healthy/adaptive as 
well as disturbed/non-adaptive personality and various forms of psychopathology (Moeller, 
Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001). One of the mechanism by which high impulsivity 
may relate to other traits and forms of psychopathology is altered time perception. Research has 
shown equivocal associations between impulsivity and time perception. Likewise, time 
perception has been shown to have inconsistent associations with different cognitive and 
affective factors and psychopathology, especially in clinical samples. The main objective of this 
study was to attain clearer understanding on how impulsivity and time perception might be 
related to one another and to one form of psychopathology: pathological gambling. There appear 
robust associations between impulsivity and pathological gambling. Here we tested the 
hypothesis that the impulsivity-gambling association might be mediated by individual 
differences in time perception.  
Impulsivity 
 A plethora of conceptualizations of impulsivity exist, varying in the research paradigm of 
origin (e.g. theories and models of personality and temperament, the information processing 
perspective, the neuropsychological, physiological and also psychopathological perspective of 
impulsivity) and research methods that have been used to uncover the essence of that construct 
(e.g. self-report measures, laboratory behavioral measures). As a result there is a lack of common 
understanding on how to define and measure impulsivity: there appear inconsistencies in labeling 
the differences and similarities in construct content by different researchers within and/or across 
different theories (Block, 1995; Whitside & Lynam, 2001). The notion that the umbrella term of 
impulsivity has complicated the research (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) and that the construct of 
impulsivity thus needs to be revised and clarified has been confirmed by many researchers. 
Impulsivity appears to be multidimensional, multi-faceted and/or –factorial construct (Dickman, 
1990; McDonald, Schleifer, Richards, & de Wit, 2003; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; 
Stanford et al., 2009) having different underlying cognitive, physiological and neurobiological 
correlates (Dickman, 1990; Dickman, 2000; Evenden, 1999; Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & 
Stein, 2002; Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; McDonald, Schleifer, Richards, & de Wit, 2003; 
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Newman & Wallace, 1993; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). But the problem is even more complex. 
It has been demonstrated that self-report and behavioral measures of impulsivity are not directly 
related, and even among the behavioral measures different tasks measure slightly different and 
unrelated aspects of impulsivity (Dougherty, Mathias, Marsh, & Jagar, 2005; Gorlyn, Keilp, 
Tryon, & Mann, 2005; Havik et al., 2012; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006).  
 Whitside and Lynam (2001) have made an effort to clarify the multi-faceted construct of trait 
impulsivity by analyzing a variety of commonly used self-reported impulsivity measures within 
the framework of the Five Factor Model of Personality (FFM; McCrae & Costa, 1990) as 
embodied in the NEO-PI-R personality questionnaire (Costa & McCrae, 1992). They identified 
four distinct personality facets that lead to impulsive-like behaviors stating that these four facets 
should not be considered variations of impulsivity but “rather discrete psychological processes 
that lead to impulsive-like behaviors” (p.685) as each of the four components is related to 
distinct aspect of personality as described by FFM. Urgency (U) was found to be associated with 
the impulsiveness facet, (lack of) premeditation (P) with deliberation, (lack of) perseverance (P) 
with the self-discipline and sensation seeking (S) with the excitement seeking facet of the NEO-
PI-R. As a result, the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale was created. 
Impulsivity and gambling 
 Impulsivity serves as a predominant etiologic characteristic of different conceptual models of 
gambling that are based on impulse control (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), addiction 
(Blume, 1987; Jacobs, 1986; Leeman & Potenza, 2012) and obsessive-compulsive spectrum 
disorders (Skitch & Hodgins, 2004). From such a clinical point of view, impulsivity plays 
important role in understanding and diagnosis of pathological gambling (PG). 
 Pathological gamblers have impaired control over their urge to gamble, they engage in 
repetitive uncontrolled gambling that leads to serious destructive consequences in their life. 
Currently, thus, pathological gambling is formally categorized as an impulse control disorder by 
American Psychiatric Association (2000), a progressive and chronic disorder that encompasses 
an unrelenting failure to resist impulses to gamble and where this ‘‘maladaptive behavior 
disrupts, or damages personal, family, or vocational pursuits’’.  
 Even though PG is classified as a disorder of impulse control, the evidence is mixed 
regarding whether pathological gamblers are more impulsive than controls (Petry, 2001) and 
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there are controversial findings as to how trait impulsivity is related to PG. This might be related 
to the conceptual mess that is impulsivity as well as to high co-morbidity rate of different 
psychiatric disorders among PGs demonstrated by several researchers (Hodgins, Peden, & 
Cassidy, 2005; Kaare, Mõttus, & Konstabel, 2009; Petry, Stinson, & Grant, 2005). In their 
comprehensive review, Raylu and Oei (2002) pointed to several studies that have demonstrated 
impulsivity being a major characteristic in PG. Indeed, abundant data confirm heightened 
impulsiveness being related to severe disturbances in pathological gamblers (Alessi & Petry, 
2003; MacCallum, Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, & Nower, 2007; Steel & Blaszczynski, 1998; 
Vitaro, Arsenault, & Tremblay, 1997). Two Estonian gambling studies found that heightened 
impulsiveness was associated with the degree of severe disturbances in pathological gamblers 
(Kaare, Mõttus, & Konstabel, 2009; Laansoo, 2005). Likewise Steel and Blaszczynski (1998) 
demonstrated on gamblers in treatment that impulsivity is related to the severity of gambling 
behavior. Rodriguez-Jimenez et al. (2006) have demonstrated how co-morbidity of two 
impulsivity prone psychiatric disorders, pathological gambling and attention deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), may contribute to impulsivity depending on disorder specific impairments. 
They found that PGs with a history of childhood ADHD have lower capacity to delay 
gratification and less inhibitory control than PGs without such childhood history. 
 However, Langewisch and Frisch (1998) investigated the relationship between sensation 
seeking, impulsivity, risky behaviors and gambling and found that pathological gamblers’ 
sensation seeking and impulsivity scores did not correlate with their degree of gambling 
pathology. Somewhat consistently, Bagby et al. (2007) reported that, relative to the population 
norms, pathological and non-pathological gamblers had equally high scores on excitement-
seeking, a personality trait akin to sensation-seeking. This suggested that excitement-seeking 
characterizes gambling behavior generally rather than pathological gambling in particular. Based 
on a very small sample, Allcock and Grace (1988) reported that pathological gamblers were 
neither sensation-seekers nor impulsive. On a sample of Estonian gamblers in treatment, it was 
found that PGs tended to score higher on excitement-seeking than controls but the effect was not 
significant (Kaare, Mõttus, & Konstabel, 2009). 
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Impulsive behavior and time perception 
 One of the potential components to be considered as underlying mechanism for impulsive 
behavior could be time perception; more precisely, cognitive tempo as the subjective experience 
of time (Havik et al., 2012; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). According to Burns and Lennings 
(1998), the notion that impulsivity is somehow associated with time estimation goes back to 
Siegman´s (1961) studies with young offenders. Since then ambiguous results have been 
reported and the evidence for impulsivity being associated with how people perceive time is not 
unanimous. 
 For instance, Gerbing, Ahadi, and Patton (1987) found moderate to low correlations between 
various self-reported impulsivity scales and time estimation measures. Burns and Lennings 
(1998) did not find consistent effects between time estimation and impulsivity measures in 
young and healthy college students. In contrast, Barratt (1983) found that high-impulsive 
subjects under produced time, i.e., produced shorter time intervals in time-production tasks, thus 
suggesting that they have faster cognitive tempo than low-impulsive subjects. Likewise several 
findings from clinical populations demonstrate that impulsive subjects tend to overestimate 
and/or under produce time intervals suggesting their subjective experience of time is accelerated 
compared to subjects with lower levels of both self-reported and behaviorally tested impulsivity 
(Berlin & Rolls, 2004; Berlin, Rolls, & Kischka, 2004; Dougherty et al., 2003; Reynolds & 
Schiffbauer, 2004; Wittmann, Leland, Churan, & Paulus, 2007). Most recently, similar findings 
with healthy (not evaluated for having psychological and/or psychiatric disorders) participants 
have been reported by Correa, Triviño, Pérez-Dueñas, Acosta, and Lupiàñez (2010) and Havik et 
al. (2012).  
 Wittmann and Paulus (2008) have proposed a theoretical model stating that impulsive 
individuals perceive time differently than self-controlled individuals because of an increased rate 
of accumulated pulses coming from their 'internal clocks' (see Fig.2, Wittmann & Paulus, 2008), 
which results in overestimation and/or under production of interval duration. The cognitive 
model proposed by these authors is linked to the attentional-gate model by Zakay and Block 
(1997) but differs in stating that ´mood states´ can influence the subjective experience of interval 
duration in two ways. First, arousal can increase the rate of pulses emitted by a hypothetical 
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pacemaker. Second, increased attention to time is supposed to open the gate to a central counting 
mechanism which leads to accumulation of more pulses. 
 Above-mentioned ´mood states´ as referred to by Wittmann and Paulus (2008), affective and 
cognitive factors altering time perception are assumed to be dependent on altered internal and/or 
external stimuli. For instance altered physiological conditions (e.g. sleep deprivation, increase in 
body temperature, administration of stimulants), clinical state (e.g. acute stress, personality 
and/or psychiatric disorder) and/or environmental changes (e.g. emotional faces as an external 
stimulus evoking emotions) can lead to increased arousal resulting in impulsive like behavior 
(see p.10, Wittmann & Paulus, 2008 for prevalently clinical data). These authors also suggest 
that attention-related and activation-induced mechanisms proposed to alter the sense of time 
according to their cognitive model of time perception and impulsivity are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive but could contribute to the phenomenon of altered time perception in additive 
ways. Wittmann and Paulus (2008) also speculate that the documented failures to find relations 
between impulsivity and time estimation might have originated from the relatively normal 
variation of impulsivity in healthy subjects that “might not be strong enough to alter the 
subjective experience of time” (p.11, Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). Experimental results referred 
by Wittmann and Paulus (2008) with children and adults with ADHD give good reason to 
hypothesize that disorder-specific features as distractibility and other impaired attention related 
processes for ADHD make the contribution and might be the reason behind equivocal results 
describing the relationship between impulsiveness and time estimation (see p.10-11, Wittmann & 
Paulus, 2008).  
Time perception and gambling 
 Given the implication of timing for impulsivity and the possible contribution of the latter to 
gambling, it is reasonable to ask how differences in timing performance relate to gambling risk. 
However, this question has not been systematically addressed before. Evidence in gambling 
research suggests a range of contextual and individual differences as risk factors for gambling 
behavior but the relationship between gambling behavior and time perception in association with 
impulsivity as viewed by Wittmann and Paulus (2008) has been ulterior for gambling research. 
Gambling behavior has only been considered in relation to the time perspective construct, an 
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individual´s orientation toward the past, present and future, by some researchers (MacKillop, 
Anderson, Castelda, Mattson, & Donovick, 2006; Petry, 2001).  
 The current study: impulsivity, time perception and gambling 
 With this study we attempt to shed some light on association between an altered sense of 
time, impulsivity and PG. First it is hypothesized that impulsive subjects tend to perceive time 
intervals as shorter compared to self-controlled subjects, i.e. their averaged perceived interval 
duration is lower than that of more self-controlled subjects. Secondly, given the above-described 
literature, we hypothesize that the role of impulsivity in the etiology of pathological gambling is 
mediated by altered time perception (see Fig.1). We will also test the effect and differentiate 
impact of co-variates as age, gender, education and nationality on gambling behavior, time 
perception and impulsivity.  
 
 
Figure 1 Working hypothesis about the mediated impact of impulsivity in etiology of pathological gambling. 
 
Method 
Design and participants 
 The data were collected in the course of prevalence study of problem gambling “Contacts of 
the Estonian residents with gambling” in 2010 (Emor, 2010). The survey sample, representative 
to population, consisted in total 3530 residents of Estonia, in age range 15-74 years (M = 45.4, 
SD = 17.04), men (46.8%) and woman (53.2%), Estonians (67.9%) and non-Estonian residents 
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of Estonia (32.1%) with different educational and socio-economical background. The subjects 
with a TPT (Time Production Task) result outside of the +/- 3 standard deviations (from the 
mean) range were excluded based on the assumption that the subject did not understand the task 
or was not motivated to follow instructions. Descriptive information regarding the relevant 
measures is in Table 2. 
 The interviews were held by 78 trained interviewers in face to face manner using CAPI 
method (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing). The questions were displayed on a laptop 
screen and the answers were typed directly to the computer by the interviewee. Participants 
completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) and the modified Impulsive Behavior Scale 
(mUPPS). In addition a time-production experiment was presented to all participants.  
 The fact of including psychological construct measures to prevalence study made some 
restraints to the choice of estimation tools and amount of tasks we could use in order to fit in the 
available budget.  
Measures 
Self-reported impulsivity measures 
 The modified UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (mUPPS) was constructed to assess trait 
impulsivity with eight comprehensive single items. Short measures have been considered 
especially useful in large scale surveys and in studies with primary interest other than personality 
as is the current study (see Konstabel, Lönnqvist, Walkowitz, Konstabel, & Verkasalo, 2012 for 
more theoretical assumptions in using and development of short scales). 
 In constructing the mUPPS two measures, the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS; 
urgency, (lack of) premeditation, (lack of) perseverance and sensation seeking) created by 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) and Short Five (S5) questionnaire constructed by Konstabel, 
Lönnqvist, Walkowitz, Konstabel, & Verkasalo (2012) were used. The original UPPS was used 
with one modification: UPPS (lack of) perseverance self-discipline (C5) items in S5 were 
replaced with S5 Dutifulness (C3) items. Then each facet was represented by two items from the 
Short Five (S5) questionnaire. More specifically, item pairs corresponding to the N5, C6, C3, 
and E5 facets of the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality were selected (see Table 1 for 
clarification in acronym usage).  
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 The UPPS (lack of) perseverance C5 items were replaced with C3 items as C3 has been 
demonstrated by Kaare, Mõttus, and Konstabel (2009) to be more sensitive in distinguishing  
PG-s from non PG-s than C5 (Table 1). Using items with higher predictive validity is in line with 
the rationale of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) stating that different facets of UPPS may have 
different criterion validity for different psychological disorders and that disorder-specific item 
selection might be an issue to consider for research in different target groups (p.685-687, 
Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Also, the (lack of) perseverance factor comprises NEO-PI-R five 
facets of conscientiousness (including C5 and C3) suggesting that these facets describe almost 
the same aspects of impulsive behavior. Deliberation (C6) loads to separate factor and is 
conceptualized in mUPPS likewise in UPPS as (lack of) premeditation (P) facet (see Table 3, 
Whiteside & Lynam, 2001, p. 679). 
 The scale used to measure these four facets of impulsivity was conceptualized as continuous 
ranging from 1 to 7, “totally disagree” to “totally agree” respectively. As each facet was 
estimated by two items, one  keyed positively and the other negatively (described in Table 1), the 
item values were summed after negatively keyed item values were reversed such that 
participants´ impulsivity scores could range from 2 to 14 with higher values indicating higher 
impulsivity.  
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Table 1 Item correction and content for mUPPS 
UPPS Impulsive 
Behavior Scale  
Associated NEO-PI-R 
personality facet  
 
Cohen d 1 
Positively keyed item in S52 subscale Negatively keyed item in S5 subscale 
Urgency (U) Impulsiveness  
(N5) 
2.08c It is very difficult for me to resist 
temptation and to keep my desires and 
feelings in check; I do things that I regret 
later 
It is easy for me to resist temptation; I can 
always control my feelings and desires 
(Lack of) 
premeditation (P) 
Deliberation  
(C6) 
-0.91c I consider things carefully before acting or 
deciding; I take the possible consequences 
of my actions into account 
I often rush into action without considering 
the consequences of my actions and decisions 
(Lack of) 
perseverance (P) 
Self-Discipline  
(C5) 
-0.29 When I have started something, I finish it 
despite fatigue or other distractions. I 
always finish my tasks on time 
I often postpone difficult or unpleasant 
activities and leave things unfinished. It is 
difficult for me to pull myself together and do 
the things that I have to 
 Dutifulness  
(C3) 
-1.12c I am a reliable person, who values ethical 
principles; I keep my promises and work 
carefully and thoroughly 
I sometimes break my promises. I do not take 
my responsibilities and ethical principles 
seriously 
Sensation seeking 
(S) 
Excitement-seeking 
(E5) 
0.28 I crave new experiences and excitement. I 
like to test myself in unknown situations 
I am not looking for excitement or adventures. 
I do not like to take risks 
NOTE: 1 effect size of differences between tests scores of pathological gamblers and controls (Kaare, Mõttus, & Konstabel, 2009); 2 comprehensive single 
item from Short Five (S5) Personality Measure (Konstabel et al., 2012); a p < 0.05, b p < 0.01, c p < 0.001  
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Time perception measures 
 There are four different methods for measuring accuracy of time perception (Wittmann & 
Paulus, 2008; Zakay & Block, 1997): (1) duration may be estimated verbally, (2) by 
reproduction, (3) by production or (4) by comparison. An estimate may be made either 
prospectively or retrospectively (i.e., participants are informed about the estimation task before 
the target duration or participants are asked to estimate duration after the target duration 
respectively). Above-mentioned methods basically fall into two categories (Dougherty, Mathias, 
Marsh, & Jagar, 2005): time estimation or time production methods. These different ways of 
estimating duration involve somewhat different cognitive processes and therefore impact 
interpretation of the results. Zakay and Block (1997) argue that “prospective judgments depend 
both on arousal level and on the amount of attention allocated to time” (p.14, 15) whereas under 
retrospective conditions “participants primarily construct a duration judgment from information 
stored in memory representing the number of contextual changes that occurred during an 
interval” (p.13). Task demands determine the amount of attention divided between “temporal and 
non temporal information processors” and “if less non temporal (stimulus) information 
processing is required, the person allocates more attention to temporal information and vice 
versa” (p.13).   
 It can be argued that the attentional demands of a concurrent task can be possible 
confounders and these can be taken under control by an empty-time condition (i.e., no concurrent 
task is performed) whereas the allocation of more or less attention to time-estimation can be 
controlled by the same kind of task instruction for all subjects. Thus we have good reasons to 
hypothesize that, under prospective and empty-time conditions, main differences in cognitive 
tempo derive from cognitive and affective processes connected to differences in arousal level. 
But the question of potential contextual influences and memory processes involved in decision 
making process in interpretation of reported relations remains open. 
 As for current study, time perception was evaluated using prospective empty-time 
computerized Time Production Task (TPT) similar to that used in previous research to measure 
cognitive tempo (Barratt, Patton, Nils, & Zuker, 1981; Barratt, 1983; Gorlyn, Keilp, Tryon, & 
Mann, 2005). The participants were asked to indicate when they thought a certain time interval 
Impulsivity, Time and Gambling   15 
 
(respectively 2, 3 and 4 seconds) had elapsed by holding down the computer space key. Subjects 
were prospectively instructed as follows:  
“Now we are going to do something different. I will estimate how you experience the flow of time 
– do you perceive time as going quicker or slower comparing to actual time duration.” 
 Four rehearsal trials with immediate feedback about how much time had elapsed while 
holding the key preceded the experimental trials. Six experimental trials were administered in 
total, so that each of three time intervals (2, 3 and 4s) was repeated two times in random order. 
For each time interval, the time produced was compared with the actual time interval participant 
was asked to produce and performance was measured as the deviation of participants’ estimates 
from the actual length of the intervals.   
Gambling prevalence and diagnostic measures 
 Prior to the gambling prevalence survey at 2010 there had been two gambling prevalence 
surveys among the Estonian population between ages 15 and 74 in 2004 and 2006 (Faktum 
Uuringukeskus, 2004; Turu-uuringud, 2006). In all three surveys, Estonian version of the South 
Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Laansoo 2005; Lesieur & Blume, 1987, 1993) was used as the 
screening instrument for assessing the risk for pathological gambling. The16-item SOGS asks 
participants to report the frequency of various symptoms related to gambling behavior.  
 The SOGS was originally developed by Lesieur and Blume (1987) based on DSM-III and 
DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) diagnostic criteria. It has become 
internationally most widely used self-report screening instrument to detect pathological gambling 
(Battersby, Thomas, Tolchard, & Esterman, 2002). The SOGS has been found to have 
satisfactory reliability with Cronbach alphas of 0.69 and 0.86 in the general population and 
gambling treatment samples, respectively (Stinchfield, 2002). It demonstrated well to excellent 
classification accuracy in the gambling treatment sample, but had poorer accuracy in the general 
population sample with a 50% false positive rate thus overestimating the number of pathological 
gamblers in the general population, as compared to DSM-IV diagnostic criteria (Stinchfield, 
2002), the notion that has been mostly exploited in criticizing the use of SOGS for prevalence 
studies (Battersby, Thomas, Tolchard, & Esterman, 2002; Young & Stevens, 2008). However, 
the SOGS is a lifetime-based measure and was originally designed to detect or uncover also 
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individuals in remission (Lesieur & Blume 1987, 1993) or “potential” cases in need for further 
clinical assessment (Battersby, Thomas, Tolchard, & Esterman, 2002). According to Battersby, 
Thomas, Tolchard, and Esterman (2002) this notion has been ignored in the reporting of 
prevalence studies where there is no clinical assessment, yet claims are made as to the prevalence 
rate of ´pathological gamblers´ in the population studied (p. 267). Thus in order to be clear in this 
distinction, in Estonian latest prevalence study at 2010 the scores were identified and described 
in the context of probable remission (i.e., in the context of risk for pathological gambling) as also 
suggested by Stinchfield (2002).  
 There are controversial findings in relation to criterion thresholds, or cutoff points, used to 
differentiate the severity of problems related to gambling. The original SOGS uses a cutoff point 
of 5 or more to identify “probable pathological” gamblers (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). Some 
researchers argue that problem gamblers have lower scores and have used a score of 3 or 4 in 
order to distinguish and classify individuals as „problem gamblers“ (Ladouceur, 1991; Lesieur et 
al., 1991; Volberg & Steadman, 1988). Battersby, Thomas, Tolchard, and Esterman (2002) 
suggest that „important differences in etiology, treatment response, motivation to seek treatment 
and cost benefit of community screening may exist between groups scoring 1 to 4, 5 to 9 and 
above (p.265). Stinchfield (2002) posits that even though scores in range 5 to 6 have about a 
50/50 chance of having the disorder, a score of 5 remains „the best cut score in terms of 
maximizing the hit rate and balancing false positive and false negative errors” both for clinical 
and non-clinical sample (Figure 1, p.12 in Stinchfield, 2002). Some recent studies have 
distinguished between non-problematic gamblers (scoring ≥ 2), problem gamblers (scoring in 
range from 3 to 4) and probable pathological gamblers (scoring ≥ 5) (Strong, Lesieur, Breen, 
Stinchfield, & Lejuez, 2004). In the Estonian prevalence study in 2010, lifetime gambling 
behavior was assessed and those who scored 0 to 1 on the SOGS were not considered gamblers. 
Those who scored 2 to 4 were considered gamblers with some problems, thus (currently) at low 
risk for pathological gambling or according to Battersby, Thomas, Tolchard, and Esterman 
(2002) as possible pathological gamblers. The score of 5 or more was used as a cutoff point for 
probable pathological gambling (Battersby, Thomas, Tolchard, & Esterman, 2002; Lesieur & 
Blume 1987, 1993). However, a further distinction was also made: scores 5-8 were considered as 
gamblers with a number of characteristics for pathological gambling or with significant risk for 
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pathological gambling whereas those scoring 9 or more were considered as „probable 
pathological gamblers“ or gamblers at high risk for pathological gambling. Thus in the 2010 
survey the cutoff points remained the same as in two previous prevalence studies in order to 
gather valid and comparable data. 
 The cutoff points for current study were conceptualized and defined as follows: those who 
scored from 0 to 1 (i.e., cutoff < 2) on the SOGS were considered non-gamblers (NoPG). Those 
scoring in range 2 to 4 were considered gamblers with some problems (ProblG), thus (currently) 
at low risk for pathological gambling and those with cutoff scores ≥ 5 were considered as 
gamblers with significant risk for pathological gambling (PG).  
Covariates 
 Gender and age differences in impulsivity and PG have been explored and reported by 
several researchers (González-Ortega, Echeburúa, Corral, Polo-López, & Alberich, 2013; 
Martins, Tavares, Sabbatini da Silva Lobo, Galetti, & Gentil, 2004). Therefore, gender (1 – men, 
2 – women) was used as a co-variate in the present study. Additionally, nationality (1 – 
Estonians, 2 – Non-Estonians) was used as a categorical co-variate, as was education (1 - below 
high school, 2 – high school, 3 – vocational school, 4 - university).     
Analytical procedures 
 First, participants with TPT (Time Production Task) values outside the range of +/- 3 
standard deviations from the mean were excluded. Then the descriptive statistics of the variables 
are reported in Table 2. Bivariate relationships between the variables are given in Table 3.  
 To describe the roles of the selected co-variates, key measures were regressed on covariates 
using linear (for mUPPS and Time) and multinomial logistic (for PG) regressions. The covariate 
effects are presented in Table 4 and Table 5 and discussed further. In order to test the first 
hypothesis about the tendency of impulsive subjects to perceive time intervals as shorter 
compared to self-controlled subjects Time was regressed on mUPPS while controlling for co-
variates (Table 6). 
 Next, structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test all hypothesized associations 
(Figure 1) simultaneously. Two latent variables were defined: mUPPS was defined by urgency 
(U), (lack of) premeditation (P), dutifulness (P), sensation seeking (S) and Time was defined by 
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six experimental TPT tasks in three sets (Time2, Time3, Time4) respectively. In the model, Time 
was predicted from mUPPS. PG, defined as ordered-categorical variable, was also predicted by 
mUPPS and Time. Essentially, then, mUPPS was defined as the causal variable predicting PG, 
whereas Time was seen as a possible mediator in the association. Time, mUPPS and PG were 
regressed on all covariates. The model was fitted using the 'lavaan' (Rosseel, 2012) package of R 
(R Core Team, 2013); diagonally weighted least squares estimator was used (DWLS). This 
initial model was then trimmed by omitting non-significant paths: the non-significant paths were 
detected using the Wald statistic. Modification indices were used to identify possible sources of 
model misspecification. The resulting SEM model, showing the unique associations among the 
variables, is given on Figure 2. 
Results 
 Significant bivariate associations were detected between impulsivity and time perception, 
impulsivity and PG: higher impulsivity was significantly associated with lower time estimates 
and higher level, i.e. severity of PG. All observed variables of mUPPS (N5, C6, C3, and E5) 
were significantly associated with PG: higher scores in these variables were linked to more PG. 
N5, C6, C3, but not E5 were significantly associated with Time. In addition, higher impulsivity 
was significantly associated with lower educational level, younger age and significant group 
differences were estimated for gender and nationality. PG was related to younger age and 
relatively higher educational level. Importantly, PG was not related to time perception. 
Significant group difference in time perception was estimated for nationality (Table 3). 
  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of sample data and used measures 
  Gamblers and non-gamblers 
  Total NoPG1 ProblG2 PG3 
N  3530 3267 184 79 
Age Range 15 – 74 15 – 74  15 – 74  16 – 68  
 M (SD) 45.44 (17.04) 46.21 (17.04) 35.23 (14.45) 37.68 (12.49) 
Gender Male 1506 1320 123 63 
 Female 2024 1947 61 16 
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Table 2 continued 
  Gamblers and non-gamblers 
  Total NoPG1 ProblG2 PG3 
Nationality Estonian 2455 2268 136 51 
 Non-Estonian 1075 999 48 28 
Education Below high school 639 576 45 18 
 High school 920 855 44 21 
 Vocational school 1194 1097 70 27 
 University 777 739 25 13 
mUPPS N 3530 3267 184 79 
 Range 2 – 13.5  2 – 13.5 2.25 – 13.25 4 – 12.5 
 M (SD) 5.71 (2.05) 5.58 (1.99) 6.99 (2.01) 8.05 (2.04) 
U(N5) Range 2 – 14  2 – 14  2 – 14  4 – 14  
 M (SD) 5.95 (2.70) 5.82 (2.66) 7.16 (2.71) 8.47 (2.49) 
P(C6) Range 2 – 14  2 – 14  2 – 14  2 – 14  
 M (SD) 5.29 (2.65) 5.18 (2.59) 6.23 (2.83) 7.84 (3.05) 
P(C3) Range 2 – 14  2 – 14  2 – 13  2 – 13  
 M (SD) 4.94 (2.38) 4.83 (2.34) 5.97 (2.43) 7.1 (2.42) 
S(E5) Range 2 – 14  2 – 14  2 – 14  2 – 14  
 M (SD) 6.67 (3.34) 6.51 (3.28) 8.63 (3.59) 8.79 (2.85) 
Time N 2941 2696 170 75 
 Range 0.02 – 6.97 0.02 – 6.97 0.25 – 5.3 1.33 – 4.61 
 M (SD) 2.44 (0.96) 2.41 (0.97) 2.62 (0.79) 2.96 (0.47) 
Time2 N 2924 2679 170 75 
 Range 0.00 – 4.8 0.00 – 4.79 0.24 – 4.29 0.88 – 3.57 
 M (SD) 1.75 (0.73) 1.73 (0.74) 1.90 (0.70) 2.07 (0.41) 
Time3 N 2935 2691 169 75 
 Range 0.00 – 6.97 0.00 – 6.97 0.29 – 5.67 1.46 – 4.55 
 M (SD) 2.46 (1.02) 2.43 (1.03) 2.64 (0.85) 2.97 (0.53) 
Time4 N 2918 2673 170 75 
 Range 0.06 – 7.51 0.06 – 7.51 0.23 – 6.87 1.64 – 6.05 
 M (SD) 3.07 (1.22) 3.04 (1.23) 3.32 (0.99) 3.82 (0.63) 
NOTE: M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; 1subjects not in risk for PG (i.e, SOGS scores 0 to 1; 2gamblers 
with some problems (i.e., SOGS scores 2 to 4); 3gamblers with high risk for PG (i.e., cutoff  ≥ 5 on the SOGS). 
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Table 3 The bivariate relationships between co-variates and study variables  
  Cohen d  Correlations between variables         
  Gender Nationality  Age Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 mUPPS 0.39c 0.12c  -0.39c -0.14c -          
2 N5 0.21c 0.18c  -0.19c -0.12c  0.76c -           
3 C6 0.20c 0.01  -0.22c -0.16c  0.80c  0.56c -         
4 C3 0.44c 0.04  -0.22c -0.16c  0.74c  0.48c  0.56c -       
5 E5 0.31c 0.17c  -0.46c  0.00  0.68c  0.28c  0.32c  0.27c -      
6 Time 0.01 0.30c   0.03 -0.02 -0.05c -0.05b -0.04a -0.06c -0.02 -     
7 Time2 0.03 0.21c   0.07c -0.03 -0.05b -0.03 -0.02 -0.05b -0.05b  0.91c -    
8 Time3 0.02 0.32c   0.03 -0.02 -0.05b -0.04a -0.03 -0.05b -0.02  0.96c  0.84c -   
9 Time4 0.06 0.29c  -0.03  0.01 -0.05b -0.05b -0.05b -0.07c  0.01  0.96c  0.80c  0.88c -  
10 PG1 - -  -0.14c -0.05b  0.21c  0.17c  0.14c  0.16c  0.16c -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 - 
NOTE: For M, SD and N look in Table 2; 1 Spearman´s correlation coefficient; a p < 0.05, b p < 0.01, c p < 0.001 
 
Table 4 Covariate effects on impulsivity, time perception and gambling behavior  
   Gambling level 
 Standardized Estimate1 (95% CIs)  Odds ratio (95% CIs) 
 mUPPS  Time  No Gambling Problem Gambling Pathological Gambling 
Gender -0.28c (-0.33; -0.22) -0.01  (-0.08;  0.06)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 0.38 (0.27; 0.52) 0.18 (0.11; 0.32) 
Age -0.02c (-0.02; -0.02)  0.00  ( 0.00;  0.00)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 0.96 (0.95; 0.97) 0.97 (0.96; 0.99) 
Nationality -0.06a (-0.13; -0.00) -0.30c (-0.38; -0.23)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 0.90 (0.64; 1.27) 1.39 (0.86; 2.24) 
Education -0.09c (-0.12; -0.06) -0.01  (-0.05;  0.02)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 0.97 (0.83; 1.13) 0.98 (0.78; 1.23) 
NOTE: 1effect sizes are per SD; a p < 0.05, b p < 0.01, c p < 0.001 
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Table 5 Covariate effects on gambling behavior when adjusted for impulsivity and time perception 
   Gambling level 
 Standardized Estimate1 (95% CIs)  Odds ratio (95% CIs) 
 mUPPS  Time  No Gambling Problem Gambling Pathological Gambling 
Gender -0.28c (-0.33; -0.22) -0.02  (-0.09;  0.05)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 0.41 (0.29; 0.58) 0.23 (0.12; 0.43) 
Age -0.02c (-0.02; -0.02)  0.02  (-0.06;  0.12)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 0.27 (0.17; 0.44) 0.79 (0.39; 1.59) 
Nationality -0.06a (-0.13; -0.00) -0.30c (-0.37; -0.22)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 1.03 (0.70; 1.49) 1.84 (1.06; 3.20)2 
Education -0.09c (-0.12; -0.06) -0.02  (-0.05;  0.02)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 1.03 (0.87; 1.22) 1.13 (0.86; 1.48) 
NOTE: 1effect sizes are per SD; 2 becomes significant as predictor when adjusted for impulsivity and time perception; a p < 0.05, b p < 0.01, c p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 6 Regression coefficients for study variables while controlling for covariates 
   Gambling level 
 Standardized Estimate1 (95% CIs)  Odds ratio (95% CIs) 
 Time  No Gambling Problem Gambling Pathological Gambling 
mUPPS -0.06b (-0.09; -0.02)  1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 1.55 (1.29; 1.85) 3.04 (2.31; 4.01) 
Time   1.00 (1.00; 1.00) 0.99 (0.83; 1.19) 0.83 (0.63; 1.09) 
NOTE: 1effect size per SD; b p < 0.01, c p < 0.001;  
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 In addition, to describe the roles of the selected co-variates, key measures were regressed on 
covariates. While simultaneously controlling for all the other variables, higher impulsivity was 
significantly associated with lower education (i.e., any relatively higher educational level 
predicts, on average, 0.9 standard deviation lower scores in mUPPS), younger age (i.e., ageing 
for one standard deviation predicts 0.2 standard deviations lower scores in mUPPS), nationality 
(i.e., non-Estonians scored lower than Estonians on mUPPS by an average of 0.06 standard 
deviations) and gender (i.e., woman score lower for impulsivity an average of 0.28 standard 
deviations than men) (Table 4).  
 Time perception was significantly associated and time intervals were under produced 
depending on nationality and the level of impulsivity: non-Estonians tended to under produce 
time intervals on average 0.30 standard deviations more than Estonians with the same 
impulsivity score and all the covariates controlled (Table 5). Everything else equal, those scoring 
higher for impulsivity tend to under produce time intervals on average 0.06 standard deviations 
more (Table 6). Time perception was not related and cannot be predicted by gender, age and 
education.  
 PG severity was significantly associated with gender and age: men have on average 2.63 
times higher odds to have gambling related problems and 5.26 times higher odds for PG than 
women (Table 4). When adjusted for impulsivity and time perception  the impact of gender was 
slightly changed to the benefit of men: 2.44 times higher odds for problem gambling and to 4.33 
times higher odds for PG thus indicating that a fraction of the gender-differences in gambling 
severity was due to gender-differences in impulsivity and time perception. Likewise age was 
significant predictor for PG: when adjusting for impulsivity and time perception and everything 
else equal there are 3.7 times higher odds in younger age for problems related gambling behavior 
comparing to non-gamblers (Table 5). PG is also predicted by impulsivity: one standard 
deviation higher mUPPS score raises odds for problem gambling by 1.55 times and for gambling 
pathology by 3.04 times. With respect to nationality, the estimate becomes significant for non-
Estonians when controlling for impulsivity and time perception so that non-Estonians have 1.84 
times higher odds for pathology comparing to Estonians. PG was not associated with time 
perception.  
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 After an initial SEM model was fitted on data, all parameters were estimated using Wald 
statistic and the parameters with p > 0.05 were dismissed from equations. Nationality and 
education were dismissed as predictors of PG. Gender, age and education were dismissed as 
predictor of Time and nationality no longer predicted mUPPS. Modification indices were also 
used to detect any sources of model misspecification: based on modification indices the residual 
variances of N5 and C6 were allowed to co-vary. The resulting SEM model, showing the unique 
associations among the variables, is given on Figure 2. The model fit indices were as follows: 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.95 and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 
0.06 (90% CI: 0.05; 0.07) thus indicating relatively good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The 
effect sizes between all variables have minor changes comparing to associations described in 
Table 5 and Table 6. All the paths shown on the Figure 2 are significant at p < 0.001 with one 
exception: the direct and no significant association between Time and PG that was left on the 
figure for illustrative purposes since it pertained to the main hypothesis of the study. 
 As the result, gender, younger age and lower education predict higher impulsivity scores. 
Gender (i.e., being a man), younger age and higher impulsivity level are predictive of future 
problems and pathology related to gambling: one standard deviation higher scores in mUPPS 
raise the risk for problems and pathology related to gambling on average by 0.36 standard 
deviations. Impulsive subjects tend to perceive time intervals as shorter and they under produce 
time intervals by 0.08 standard deviations compared to more self-controlled subjects. Impulsivity 
is associated with PG but this association is not mediated by time perception as was 
hypothesized.   
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Figure 2 A path model specifying associations between impulsivity, time perception and gambling. Numbers 
represent standardized path coefficients. All significant paths are shown (p < 0.001) with solid lines.  
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Discussion 
This study showed that time perception was associated with self-reported impulsivity such that 
time interval under production could be predicted by the level of impulsivity. To the extent that 
these associations can be interpreted as causal, the possible impact of impulsivity in the etiology 
of pathological gambling was confirmed but the hypothesized mediator role of time perception in 
the association was not detected.  
 An association between impulsivity and time perception has been demonstrated by previous 
research as referred earlier. Several findings have demonstrated that impulsive subjects tend to 
overestimate and/or under produce time intervals suggesting their subjective experience of time 
is accelerated compared to subjects with lower levels of both self-reported and behaviorally 
tested impulsivity (Dougherty et al., 2003; Havik et al., 2012; Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004; 
Wittmann, Leland, Churan, & Paulus, 2007). Our results confirm significant associations 
between these two constructs. They also constitute a demonstration of an expected relationship 
between self-reported and behavioral measures of impulsivity that have been reported missing in 
several studies. More specifically, the self-reported questionnaire (mUPPS) and time production 
task (TPT) measured here on a large sample small but significant correlation. It has been 
demonstrated by Wittmann et al. (2011) that brain activation during the interval reproduction 
task in motor execution areas (left pre and post central cortexes, right cerebellum) and the ‘core 
control network’ (i.e., inferior frontal, parietal, medial frontal cortex, anterior insula) correlated 
with both self-reported impulsivity and with behavioral performance in the duration reproduction 
task. Thus, neural substrates for trait impulsivity measured by mUPPS in our study and time 
production associated with impulsivity overlap at least to some degree and it may explain 
significant associations between higher trait impulsivity and time under productions identified 
with this study. 
 The results of this study that PG is not associated with timing performance and thus the 
impact of impulsivity on PG is not mediated by time perception is somewhat surprising. Given 
that impulsivity was related to both timing performance as well as gambling risk, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the subjects in risk for pathological gambling will also demonstrate 
time under-productions in TPT task. One possible reason we could not detect associations 
between time perception and risk for PG may be connected to the notion exploited in criticizing 
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the use of SOGS for prevalence studies and PG screening. As described earlier, the SOGS has 
demonstrated good to excellent classification accuracy in the gambling treatment sample, but 
poorer accuracy in the general population sample with a 50% false positive rate thus 
overestimating the number of pathological gamblers in the general population, as compared to 
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria (Battersby, Thomas, Tolchard, & Esterman, 2002; Stinchfield, 2002; 
Young & Stevens, 2008). Thus it is possible that because of potentially high rate of false positive 
results, i.e., because of the low specificity of the measurement tool used, we could not 
differentiate impairments in time perception as a possible mediator for impulsivity related 
disorder. However, as the sample used in this study was representative to population, there is a 
solid base to argue that gambling behavior and PG specific impairments related to impulsivity 
might be mediated by some other aspect of impulsivity than was assessed with time production 
task (i.e., cognitive tempo). While several findings from clinical populations demonstrate that 
impulsive subjects tend to overestimate and/or under produce time intervals as described 
hereinbefore, but not confirmed with this study, the question of time perception in relation to PG 
requires further research. 
  The study demonstrated that there appear simultaneous multivariate associations between 
study variables and covariate effect sizes vary significantly across gender, age and nationality 
and affect the results depending on whether PG severity was regressed only on co-variates or 
additionally adjusted for impulsivity and time perception. This supported the choice for SEM as 
the analytical method. As for conclusion: gender, younger age and lower education predict 
higher impulsivity scores. Gender (i.e., being a man), younger age and higher impulsivity level 
are predictive of future problems and pathology related to gambling. These results are in sum 
consistent with previous research (González-Ortega, Echeburúa, Corral, Polo-López, & Alberich, 
2013; Hermano et al., 2010; Kaare, Mõttus, & Konstabel, 2009). The result that relatively higher 
educational level was related to lower self-reported impulsivity and vice versa is somewhat 
consistent with what was reported by Kaare, Mõttus, & Konstabel (2009) that the likelihood of 
being a pathological gambler was best predicted by high immoderation score and low cognitive 
ability. With respect to nationality being associated with timing such that non-Estonians tended 
to under produce time intervals more than Estonians with the same impulsivity score is in line 
with the common stereotype that non-Estonians, especially Russians are more outgoing and 
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expressive and therefore possibly more impulsive than Estonians. As these differences were not 
subject for systematic research for this study, any substantial inferences could be misleading and 
arbitrary.  
 The strength of this study was in large sample representative to population of Estonia thus 
adding statistical power for the results and conclusions of this study. However, this study was 
limited in that the available budget did set the limit to the amount of items to use in additional 
questionnaires and experimental tasks as the psychological construct measures were added to 
prevalence study. Participants took the tests at their homes thus the context was not controlled by 
all means. From another point of view it can be also interpreted as adding ecological validity to 
current study. It should be also noted that in this study we used only relatively short interval 
prospective estimations and the results should be interpreted accordingly as longer and/or shorter 
interval (re)productions and retrospective estimates are influenced by different cognitive, 
affective and contextual factors as it has been argued by Zakay and Block (1997). 
 The interest of further study might be to explore more specifically how the four facets 
associated with impulsive-like behavior identified by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) relate to PG 
and time perception. It has been stated by several researchers that given the possibly multi-
faceted structure of impulsivity, understanding the relative contribution of each of its facets is 
critical for accurately characterizing an individual´s general level of impulsivity as well as for 
exploring more subtle relationships between impulsivity and different clinical syndromes 
(Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; Stanford et al., 2009). In the context of gambling research it 
has been hypothesized that different facets of impulsivity make different contributions to PG 
variability. For instance, Bagby et al. (2007) demonstrated that excitement-seeking characterizes 
gambling behavior generally rather than pathological gambling in particular. In our study we 
used the modified Impulsive Behavior Scale (mUPPS) with eight comprehensive single items 
such that two items measured each of the four impulsivity related personality facets proposed by 
Whitside and Lynam (2001). However, these four facets had fairly similar associations with PG. 
N5, C6, C3, but not E5 were significantly associated with timing. It might well be that E5 has 
protective function in etiology of gambling pathology and independent additive effect on time 
perception. This may also suggest little discriminant validity for the four impulsivity facets, at 
least in relation to gambling behavior. On the flip side, this demonstrates the robustness of the 
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latent impulsivity trait that presumably defined the common variance of the four facets. Also an 
alternative model development could be the interest of further research as there may be 
alternative causal interpretation regarding the relationships between impulsivity, time perception 
and gambling. 
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